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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynam-
ical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolu-
tionary dynamics in multi–agent systems. In particular, it has
been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi–agent
learning dynamics. To the best of our knowledge, we pro-
vide in this paper the first replicator dynamics applicable to
the sequence form of an extensive–form game, allowing an
exponential reduction of time and space w.r.t. the currently
adopted replicator dynamics for normal form. Furthermore,
our replicator dynamics is realization equivalent to the stan-
dard replicator dynamics for normal form. We prove our re-
sults for both discrete–time and continuous–time cases. Fi-
nally, we extend standard tools to study the stability of a strat-
egy profile to our replicator dynamics.
Introduction
Game theory provides the most elegant tools to model strate-
gic interaction situations among rational agents. These situ-
ations are customarily modeled as games (FT91) in which
the mechanism describes the rules and strategies describe
the behavior of the agents. Furthermore, game theory pro-
vides a number of solution concepts. The central one is
Nash equilibrium. Game theory assumes agents to be ra-
tional and describes “static” equilibrium states. Evolution-
ary game theory (Cre03) drops the assumption of rational-
ity and assumes agents to be adaptive in the attempt to
describe dynamics of evolving populations. Interestingly,
there are strict relations between game theory solution con-
cepts and evolutionary game theory steady states, e.g., Nash
equilibria are steady states. Evolutionary game theory is
commonly adopted to study economic evolving popula-
tions (CNP07) and artificial multi–agent systems, e.g., for
describing multi–agent learning dynamics (THV06; TP07;
PTL08) and as heuristics in algorithms (KMT11). In this
paper, we develop efficient techniques for evolutionary dy-
namics with extensive–form games.
Extensive–form games are a very important class of
games. They provide a richer representation than strategic–
form games, the sequential structure of decision–making be-
ing described explicitly and each agent being allowed to
be free to change her mind as events unfold. The study
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of extensive–form games is carried out by translating the
game by means of tabular representations (SLB08). The
most common is the normal form. Its advantage is that all
the techniques applicable to strategic–form games can be
adopted also with this representation. However, the size of
normal form grows exponentially with the size of the game
tree, thus being impractical. The agent form is an alterna-
tive representation whose size is linear in the size of the
game tree, but it makes, even with two agents, each agent’s
best–response problem highly non–linear. To circumvent
these issues, sequence form was proposed (vS96). This form
is linear in the size of the game tree and does not intro-
duce non–linearities in the best–response problem. On the
other hand, standard techniques for strategic–form games
cannot be adopted with such representation, e.g. (LH64),
thus requiring alternative ad hoc techniques, e.g. (Lem78).
In addition, sequence form is more expressive than normal
form. For instance, working with sequence form it is pos-
sible to find Nash–equilibrium refinements for extensive–
form games—perfection based Nash equilibria and sequen-
tial equilibrium (MS10; GI11)—while it is not possible with
normal form.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no result dealing
with the adoption of evolutionary game theory tools with
sequence form for the study of extensive–form games, all
the known results working with the normal form (Cre03).
In this paper, we originally explore this topic, providing the
following main contributions.
• We show that the standard replicator dynamics for nor-
mal form cannot be adopted with the sequence form, the
strategies produced by replication not being well–defined
sequence–form strategies.
• We design an ad hoc version of the discrete–time repli-
cator dynamics for sequence form and we show that it is
sound, the strategies produced by replication being well–
defined sequence–form strategies.
• We show that our replicator dynamics is realization equiv-
alent to the standard discrete–time replicator dynamics for
normal form and therefore that the two replicator dynam-
ics evolve in the same way.
• We extend our discrete–time replicator dynamics to the
continuous–time case, showing that the same properties
are satisfied and extending standard tools to study the sta-
bility of the strategies to our replicator.
Game theoretical preliminaries
Extensive–form game definition. A perfect–
information extensive–form game (FT91) is a tuple
(N,A,V,T, ι, ρ,χ,u), where: N is the set of agents (i ∈ N
denotes a generic agent), A is the set of actions (Ai ⊆ A
denotes the set of actions of agent i and a ∈ A denotes
a generic action), V is the set of decision nodes (Vi ⊆ V
denotes the set of decision nodes of i), T is the set of
terminal nodes (w ∈ V ∪ T denotes a generic node and
w0 is root node), ι ∶ V → N returns the agent that acts at
a given decision node, ρ ∶ V → ℘(A) returns the actions
available to agent ι(w) at w, χ ∶ V ×A→ V ∪ T assigns the
next (decision or terminal) node to each pair ⟨w,a⟩ where
a is available at w, and u = (u1, . . . , u∣N ∣) is the set of
agents’ utility functions ui ∶ T → R. Games with imperfect
information extend those with perfect information, allowing
one to capture situations in which some agents cannot
observe some actions undertaken by other agents. We
denote by Vi,h the h–th information set of agent i. An
information set is a set of decision nodes such that when an
agent plays at one of such nodes she cannot distinguish the
node in which she is playing. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that every information set has a different index h,
thus we can univocally identify an information set by h.
Furthermore, since the available actions at all nodes w
belonging to the same information set h are the same,
with abuse of notation, we write ρ(h) in place of ρ(w)
with w ∈ Vi,h. An imperfect–information game is a tuple
(N,A,V,T, ι, ρ,χ,u,H) where (N,A,V,T, ι, ρ,χ,u) is a
perfect–information game and H = (H1, . . . ,H∣N ∣) induces
a partition Vi = ⋃h∈Hi Vi,h such that for all w,w′ ∈ Vi,h we
have ρ(w) = ρ(w′). We focus on games with perfect recall
where each agent recalls all the own previous actions and
the ones of the opponents (FT91).
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Figure 1: Example of two–agent perfect–information
extensive–form game, x.y denote the y–th node of agent x.
(Reduced) Normal form (vNM44). It is a tabular rep-
resentation in which each normal–form action, called plan
and denoted by p ∈ Pi where Pi is the set of plans of agent i,
specifies one action a per information set. We denote by pii
a normal–form strategy of agent i and by pii(p) the probabil-
ity associated with plan p. The number of plans (and there-
fore the size of the normal form) is exponential in the size
of the game tree. The reduced normal form is obtained from
the normal form by deleting replicated strategies (VJ98). Al-
though reduced normal form can be much smaller than nor-
mal form, it is exponential in the size of the game tree.
Example 1 The reduced normal form of the game in Fig. 1
and a pair of normal–form strategies are:
agent 2
l r
a
ge
n
t1
L1∗ 2, 4 2, 4
R1L2L3 3, 1 2, 1
R1L2R3 3, 1 4, 2
R1R2L3 3, 3 2, 1
R1R2R3 3, 3 4, 2
pi1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi1,L1∗ =
1
3
pi1,R1L2L3 = 0
pi1,R1L2R3 =
1
3
pi1,R1R2L3 = 0
pi1,R1R2R3 =
1
3
pi2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi2,l = 1
pi2,r = 0
Agent form (Kuh50; Sel75). It is a tabular representation
in which each agent is replicated in a number of fictitious
agents, each per information set, and all the fictitious agents
of the same agent have the same utility. A strategy is com-
monly said behavioral and denoted by σi. We denote by
σi(a) the probability associated with action a ∈ Ai. The
agent form is linear in the size of the game tree.
Sequence form (vS96). It is a representation constituted
by a tabular and a set of constraints. Sequence–form actions
are called sequences. A sequence q ∈ Qi of agent i is a set
of consecutive actions a ∈ Ai where Qi ⊆ Q is the set of
sequences of agent i and Q is the set of all the sequences.
A sequence can be terminal, if, combined with some se-
quence of the opponents, it leads to a terminal node, or non–
terminal otherwise. In addition, the initial sequence of every
agent, denoted by q∅, is said empty sequence and, given se-
quence q ∈ Qi leading to some information set h ∈ Hi, we
say that q′ extends q and we denote by q′ = q∣a if the last
action of q′ (denoted by a(q′) = a′) is some action a ∈ ρ(h)
and q leads to h. We denote by w = h(q) the node w with
a(q) ∈ ρ(w); by q′ ⊆ q a subsequence of q; by xi the
sequence–form strategy of agent i and by xi(q) the probabil-
ity associated with sequence q ∈ Qi. Finally, condition q → h
is true if sequence q crosses information set h. Well–defined
strategies are such that, for every information set h ∈Hi, the
probability xi(q) assigned to the sequence q leading to h
is equal to the sum of the probabilities xi(q′)s where q′
extends q at h. Sequence form constraints are xi(q∅) = 1
and xi(q) = ∑a∈ρ(w) xi(q∣a) for every sequence q, action a,
node w such that w = h(q∣a), and for every agent i. The
agent i’s utility is represented as a sparse multi–dimensional
array, denoted, with an abuse of notation, by Ui, specifying
the value associated with every combination of terminal se-
quences of all the agents. The size of the sequence form is
linear in the size of the game tree.
Example 2 The sequence form of the game in Fig. 1 and a
pair of sequence–form strategies are:
agent 2
q∅ l r
a
ge
n
t1
q∅
L1 2, 4
R1
R1L2 3, 1
R1R2 3, 3
R1L3 2, 1
R1R3 4, 2
x1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
1
1
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
0
2
3
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
x2 =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1
1
0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
Replicator dynamics. The standard discrete–time repli-
cator equation with two agents is (Cre03):
pi1(p, t+ 1) = pi1(p, t) ⋅
e
T
p ⋅U1 ⋅pi2(t)
pi
T
1
(t) ⋅U1 ⋅pi2(t)
(1)
pi2(p, t+ 1) = pi2(p, t) ⋅
pi
T
1
(t) ⋅U2 ⋅ ep
pi
T
1
(t) ⋅U2 ⋅pi2(t)
(2)
while the continuous–time one is
p˙i1(p) = pi1(p) ⋅ [(ep −pi1)T ⋅U1 ⋅pi2] (3)
p˙i2(p) = pi2(p) ⋅ [piT1 ⋅U2 ⋅ (ep −pi2)] (4)
where ep is the vector in which the p–th component is “1”
and the others are “0”.
Discrete–time replicator dynamics for
sequence–form representation
Initially, we show that the standard discrete–time replicator
dynamics for normal form cannot be directly applied when
sequence form is adopted. Standard replicator dynamics ap-
plied to the sequence form is easily obtained by considering
each sequence q as a plan p and thus substituting eq to ep
in (1)–(2) where eq is zero for all the components q′ such
that q′ ≠ q and one for the component q′ such that q′ = q.
Proposition 3 The replicator (1)–(2) does not satisfy the
sequence–form constraints.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider x1(t)
and x2(t) equal to the strategies used in Example 2. At time
t + 1 the strategy profile generated by (1)–(2) is:
x
T
1
(t+1) = [ 0 1
3
0
1
2
1
6
0 0 ] xT
2
(t+1) = [ 1
2
1
2
0 ]
that does not satisfy the sequence–form constraints, e.g.,
xi(q∅, t + 1) ≠ 1 for all i. ◻
The critical issue behind the failure of the standard repli-
cator dynamics lies in the definition of vector eq. Now we
describe how the standard discrete–time replicator dynam-
ics can be modified to be applied to the sequence form. In
our variation, we substitute eq with an opportune vector gq
that depends on the strategy xi(t) and it is generated as de-
scribed in Algorithm 1, obtaining:
x1(q, t + 1) = x1(q, t) ⋅ g
T
q (x1(t)) ⋅U1 ⋅ x2(t)
xT
1
(t) ⋅U1 ⋅ x2(t) (5)
x2(q, t + 1) = x2(q, t) ⋅ x
T
1
(t) ⋅U2 ⋅ gq(x2(t))
xT
1
(t) ⋅U2 ⋅x2(t) (6)
The basic idea behind the construction of vector gq is:
• assigning “1” to the probability of all the sequences con-
tained in q,
• normalizing the probability of the sequences extending
the contained in q,
• assigning “0” to the probability of all the other sequences.
We describe the generation of vector gq(xi(t)), for clarity
we use as running example the generation of gR1R3(x1(t))
related to Example 2:
• all the components of gq(xi(t)) are initialized equal to
“0”, e.g.,
gR1R3(x1(t))T = [ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ]
• if sequence q is played, the algorithm assigns:
– “1” to all the components gq(q′,xi(t)) of gq(xi(t))
where q′ ⊆ q (i.e., q′ is a subsequence of q), e.g.,
gR1R3(x1(t))T = [ 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 ]
Algorithm 1 generate gq(xi(t))
1: gq(xi(t)) = 0
2: if xi(q, t) ≠ 0 then
3: for q′ ∈ Qi s.t. q′ ⊆ q do
4: gq(q′,xi(t)) = 1
5: for q′′ ∈ Qi s.t. q′′ ∩ q = q′ and q′′ = q′ ∣a∣ . . . : a ∈ ρ(h), q /→ h do
6: gq(q′′,xi(t)) = xi(q′′,t)xi(q′,t)
7: return gq(xi(t))
– “
xi(q′′,t)
xi(q′,t) ” to all the components gq(q′′,xi(t)) of
gq(xi(t)) where q′ ⊆ q with q′ = q′′ ∩ q and se-
quence q′′ is defined as q′′ = q′∣a∣ . . . with a ∈ ρ(h)
and q /→ h (i.e., q′ is a subsequence of q and q′′ extends
q′ off the path identified by q), e.g.,
gR1R3(x1(t))T = [ 1 0 1 12 12 0 1 ]
– all the other components are left equal to “0”,
• if sequence q is not played, gq(xi(t)) can be arbitrary,
since the q–th equation of (5)–(6) is always zero given
that xi(q, t) = 0 for every t.
All the vectors gq(x1(t)) of Example 2 are:
gq∅ gL1 gR1 gR1L2 gR1R2 gR1L3 gR1R3
q∅ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L1
1
3
1 0 0 0 0 0
R1
2
3
0 1 1 1 1 1
R1L2
1
3
0
1
2
1 0
1
2
1
2
R1R2
1
3
0
1
2
0 1
1
2
1
2
R1L3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1R3
2
3
0 1 1 1 0 1
We show that replicator dynamics (5)–(6) do not violate
sequence–form constraints.
Theorem 4 Given a well–defined sequence–form strategy
profile (x1(t),x2(t)), the output strategy profile (x1(t +
1),x2(t + 1)) of replicator dynamics (5)–(6) satisfies
sequence–form constraints.
Proof. The constraints forced by sequence form are:
• xi(q∅, t) = 1 for every i,
• xi(q, t) = ∑a∈ρ(w) xi(q∣a, t) for every sequence q, ac-
tion a, nodew such thatw = h(q∣a), and for every agent i.
Assume, by hypothesis of the theorem, that the above con-
straints are satisfied at t, we need to prove that constraints
xi(q∅, t + 1) = 1 (7)
xi(q, t + 1) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
xi(q∣a, t + 1) (8)
are satisfied. Constraint (7) always holds because
gq∅(x1(t)) = x1(t). We rewrite constraints (8) as
xi(q, t) ⋅ g
T
q (xi(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)
xT
i
(t) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) =
= ∑
a∈ρ(w)
⎛
⎝xi(q∣a, t) ⋅
g
T
q∣a(xi(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)
xT
i
(t) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)
⎞
⎠ (9)
Conditions (9) hold if the following condition holds
xi(q, t) ⋅ gTq (xi(t)) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t))) (10)
Notice that condition (10) is a vector of equalities, one per
sequence q′. Condition (10) is trivially satisfied for compo-
nents q′ such that gq(q′,xi(t)) = 0. To prove the condition
for all the other components, we introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 5 Constraint (10) holds for all components
gq(q′,xi(t)) of gq(xi(t)) such that q′ ⊆ q.
Proof. By construction, gq(q′,xi(t)) = 1 for every q′ ⊆ q.
For every extension q∣a of q, we have that q′ ⊆ q ⊂ q∣a. For
this reason gq∣a(q′,xi(t)) = 1. Thus
xi(q, t) ⋅ gq(q′,xi(t)) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gq∣a(q′,xi(t))) iff
xi(q, t) ⋅ 1 = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ 1
that holds by hypothesis. Therefore the lemma is proved. ◻
Lemma 6 Constraint (10) holds for all components
gq(q′′,xi(t)) of gq(xi(t)) where q′ ⊆ q with q′ = q′′ ∩ q
and sequence q′′ = q′∣a′∣ . . . with a′ ∈ ρ(h) and q /→ h.
Proof. For all q′′, gq(q′′,xi(t)) = xi(q
′′,t)
xi(q′,t) by construc-
tion. In the right side term of (10), for all a we can have
either q∣a ⊄ q′′ or q∣a ⊂ q′′. In the former we have that
gq∣a(q′′,xi(t)) = xi(q
′′,t)
xi(q′,t) , in the latter there exists only one
action a such that gq∣a(q′′,xi(t)) = xi(q
′′,t)
xi(q∣a,t) , while for the
other actions a∗ the value of gq∣a∗(q′′,xi(t)) is zero. Hence,
we can have two cases: if q∣a ⊄ q′′, then
xi(q, t) ⋅ gq(q′′,xi(t)) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gq∣a(q′′,xi(t))) iff
xi(q, t) ⋅ xi(q
′′, t)
xi(q′, t) = ∑a∈ρ(w)(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅
xi(q′′, t)
xi(q′, t) )
that holds by hypothesis, otherwise if q∣a ⊂ q′′, then
xi(q, t) ⋅ gq(q′′,xi(t)) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gq∣a(q′′,xi(t))) iff
xi(q, t) ⋅ xi(q
′′, t)
xi(q, t) = xi(q∣a, t) ⋅
xi(q′′, t)
xi(q∣a, t)
that always holds. Therefore the lemma is proved. ◻
From the application of Lemmas 5 and 6, it follows that
condition (10) holds. ◻
Replicator dynamics realization equivalence
There is a well–known relation, based on the concept
of realization, between normal–form and sequence–form
strategies. In order to exploit it, we introduce two results
from (KMv96).
Definition 7 (Realization equivalent) Two strategies of an
agent are realization equivalent if, for any fixed strategies of
the other agents, both strategies define the same probabili-
ties for reaching the nodes of the game tree.
Proposition 8 For an agent with perfect recall, any
normal–form strategy is realization equivalent to a
sequence–form strategy.
We recall in addition that each pure sequence–form strat-
egy corresponds to a pure normal–form strategy in the re-
duced normal form (KMv96). We can show that the evo-
lutionary dynamics of (5)–(6) are realization equivalent to
the evolutionary dynamics of the normal–form replicator dy-
namics and therefore that the two replicator dynamics evolve
in the same way.
Initially, we introduce the following lemma that we will
exploit to prove the main result.
Lemma 9 Given
• a reduced–normal–form strategy pii(t) of agent i,
• a sequence–form strategy xi(t) realization equivalent to
pii(t),
it holds that xi(q∣a, t) ⋅gTq∣a(xi(t)) is realization equivalent
to ∑p∈P ∶a∈p (pii(p, t) ⋅ eTp ) for all a ∈ Ai and q ∈ Qi with
q∣a ∈ Qi.
Proof. We denote by x˜p(t) the sequence–form strategy
realization equivalent to ep(t). According to (KMv96), we
can rewrite the thesis of the theorem as
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t)) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ x˜p(t)T ) ∀a ∈ Ai (11)
Notice that, for each action a and sequence q such that q∣a ∈
Qi, condition (11) is a vector of equality conditions. Given
a and q, two cases are possible:
1. xi(q∣a, t) = 0 and then ∑p∈P ∶a∈p pii(p, t) = 0, thus condi-
tions (11) hold;
2. xi(q∣a, t) ≠ 0, in this case:
• for all components gq∣a(q′,xi(t)) of gq∣a(xi(t)) and
x˜p(q′, t) of x˜p(t) such that q′ ⊆ q∣a, we have that
x˜p(q′, t) = 1 for all p ∈ P with a ∈ p and Algorithm 1
sets gq∣a(q′,xi(t)) = 1, thus we can rewrite (11) as
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gq∣a(q′,xi(t)) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ x˜p(q′, t)) iff
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ 1 = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ 1)
that holds by hypothesis and thus conditions (11) hold;
• for all components gq∣a(q′′,xi(t)) of gq∣a(xi(t)) and
x˜p(q′′, t) of x˜p(t) such that q′′ such that q′′ ∩ q =
q′ and sequence q′′ = q′∣a′∣ . . . with a′ ∈ ρ(h) and
q /→ h, we have that x˜p(q′′, t) = 1 for all p ∈ P with
a, a(q′′) ∈ p and “0” otherwise, and Algorithm 1 sets
gq∣a(q′′,xi(t)) = xi(q
′′
,t)
xi(q′,t) , thus we can rewrite (11) as
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gq∣a(q′′,xi(t)) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ x˜p(q′′, t)) iff
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ xi(q
′′
, t)
xi(q′, t) = ∑p∈P ∶a,a(q′′ )∈p (pii(p, t) ⋅ 1)
Using the relationship with the behavioral strategies,
we can write
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ xi(q
′′, t)
xi(q′, t) = ∏a′∈q∣aσi(a
′
, t) ⋅ ∏a′∈q′′ σi(a
′
, t)
∏a′∈q′ σi(a′, t)
Being q′ ⊆ q∣a and q′ ⊆ q′′ we have
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ xi(q
′′, t)
xi(q′, t) =
∏
a′∈q∣a/q′
σi(a′, t) ⋅ ∏
a′∈q′
σi(a′, t) ⋅ ∏
a′∈q′′/q′
σi(a′, t) =
∏
a∗∈⋃a′∈{a,a(q′′)} q(a
′)
σi(a∗, t)
that can be easily rewrite as—for details (?)—
∑
p∈P ∶a,a(q′′)∈p
pii(p, t) = ∏
a∗∈⋃a′∈{a,a(q′′)}
q(a′)
σi(a∗, t)
and therefore conditions (11) hold.
This completes the proof of the lemma. ◻
Now we state the main result. It allows us to study the
evolution of a strategy in a game directly in sequence form,
instead of using the normal form, and it guarantees that the
two dynamics (sequence and normal) are equivalent.
Theorem 10 Given
• a normal–form strategy profile (pi1(t),pi2(t)) and its
evolution (pi1(t + 1),pi2(t + 1)) according to (1)–(2),
• a sequence–form strategy profile (x1(t),x2(t)) and its
evolution (x1(t + 1),x2(t + 1)) according to (5)–(6),
if (pi1(t),pi2(t)) and (x1(t),x2(t)) are realization equiv-
alent, then also (pi1(t+1),pi2(t+1)) and (x1(t+1),x2(t+
1)) are realization equivalent.
Proof. Assume, by hypothesis of the theorem, that
(x1(t),x2(t)) is realization equivalent to (pi1(t),pi2(t)).
Thus, according to (KMv96), for every agent i it holds
xi(q∣a, t) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p, t) ∀a ∈ Ai
We need to prove that the following conditions hold:
xi(q∣a, t + 1) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p, t + 1) ∀a ∈ Ai (12)
By applying the definition of replicator dynamics, we can
rewrite the conditions (12) as:
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ g
T
q∣a(xi(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)
xT
i
(t) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) =
= ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
⎛
⎝pii(p, t) ⋅
e
T
p ⋅Ui ⋅pi−i(t)
pi
T
i
(t) ⋅Ui ⋅pi−i(t)
⎞
⎠ ∀a ∈Ai (13)
Given that, by hypothesis, xTi (t) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) = piTi (t) ⋅ Ui ⋅
pi−i(t), we can rewrite conditions (13) as:
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) =
= ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ eTp ⋅Ui ⋅pi−i(t)) ∀a ∈ Ai
These conditions hold if and only if ∑p∈P ∶a∈p (pii(p, t) ⋅ eTp )
is realization equivalent to xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t)). By
Lemma 9, this equivalence holds. ◻
Continuous–time replicator dynamics for
sequence–form representation
The sequence–form continuous–time replicator equation is
x˙1(q, t) = x1(q, t) ⋅ [(gq(x1(t))− x1(t))T ⋅U1 ⋅ x2(t)] (14)
x˙2(q, t) = x2(q, t) ⋅ [x1(t)T ⋅U2 ⋅ (gq(x2(t) − x2(t))] (15)
Theorem 11 Given a well–defined sequence–form strategy
profile (x1(t),x2(t)), the output strategy profile (x1(t +
∆t),x2(t +∆t)) of replicator dynamics (14)–(15) satisfies
sequence–form constraints.
Proof. The constraints forced by sequence form are:
• xi(q∅, t) = 1 for every i,
• xi(q, t) = ∑a∈ρ(w) xi(q∣a, t) for every sequence q, ac-
tion a, nodew such that w = h(q∣a), and for every agent i.
Assume, by hypothesis of the theorem, that constraints are
satisfied at a given time point t, we need to prove that con-
straints
xi(q∅, t +∆t) = 1 (16)
xi(q, t +∆t) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
xi(q∣a, t +∆t) (17)
are satisfied. Constraint (16) always holds because
gq(x1(t)) = x1(t). We rewrite constraints (17) as
xi(q, t) ⋅ [(gq(xi(t))− xi(t))T ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)] =
= ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a) ⋅ [(gq∣a(xi(t))− xi(t))T ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)]) (18)
Conditions (18) hold if the following conditions hold
xi(q, t) ⋅ gTq (xi(t)) = ∑
a∈ρ(w)
(xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t))) (19)
Notice that condition (19) is a vector of equalities. The above
condition is trivially satisfied for components q′ such that
gq(q′,xi(t)) = 0. From the application of Lemmas 5 and 6,
the condition (19) holds also for all the other components. ◻
Theorem 12 Given
• a normal–form strategy profile (pi1(t),pi2(t)) and its
evolution (pi1(t+∆t),pi2(t+∆t)) according to (3)–(4),
• a sequence–form strategy profile (x1(t),x2(t)) and its
evolution (x1(t + ∆t),x2(t + ∆t)) according to (14)–
(15),
if (pi1(t),pi2(t)) and (x1(t),x2(t)) are realization equiv-
alent, then also (pi1(t + ∆t),pi2(t + ∆t)) and (x1(t +
∆t),x2(t +∆t)) are realization equivalent.
Proof. Assume, by hypothesis of the theorem, that
(x1(t),x2(t)) is realization equivalent to (pi1(t),pi2(t)).
Thus, according to (KMv96), for every agent i it holds
xi(q∣a, t) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p, t) ∀a ∈ Ai
We need to prove that the following conditions hold:
xi(q∣a, t +∆t) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p, t +∆t) ∀a ∈ Ai (20)
By applying the definition of replicator dynamics, we can
rewrite the conditions (20) as:
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ [(gq∣a(xi(t))− xi(t))T ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)] =
= ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ [(ep −pii(t))T ⋅Ui ⋅pi−i(t)]) ∀a ∈ Ai (21)
Given that, by hypothesis, xTi (t) ⋅ Ui ⋅ x−i(t) = piTi (t) ⋅ Ui ⋅
pi−i(t), we can rewrite conditions (21) as:
xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) =
= ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
(pii(p, t) ⋅ eTp ⋅Ui ⋅pi−i(t)) ∀a ∈ Ai
These conditions hold if and only if ∑p∈P ∶a∈p (pii(p, t) ⋅ eTp )
is realization equivalent to xi(q∣a, t) ⋅ gTq∣a(xi(t)). By
Lemma 9, this equivalence holds. ◻
Analyzing the stability of a strategy profile
We focus on characterizing a strategy profile in terms of evo-
lutionary stability. When the continuous–time replicator dy-
namics for normal–form is adopted, evolutionary stability
can be analyzed by studying the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
in that point (AP92)—non–positiveness of the eigenvalues is
a necessary condition for asymptotical stability, while strict
negativeness of the eigenvalues is sufficient. The Jacobian is
J =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂x˙1(qi, t)
∂x1(qj , t)
∂x˙1(qi, t)
∂x2(ql, t)
∂x˙2(qk, t)
∂x1(qj , t)
∂x˙2(qk, t)
∂x2(ql, t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∀qi, qj ∈ Q1,
qk, ql ∈ Q2
In order to study the Jacobian of our replicator dynamics,
we need to complete the definition of gq(xi(t)). Indeed, we
observe that some components of gq(xi(t)) are left arbi-
trary by Algorithm 1. Exactly, some q′′ that are related to q′
with xi(q′, t) = 0. While it is not necessary to assign values
to such components during the evolution of the replicator
dynamics, it is necessary when we study the Jacobian. The
rationale follows. If xi(q′, t) = 0, then it will remain zero
even after t. Instead, if, after the dynamics converged to a
point, such a point has xi(q′) = 0 for some q′, it might
be the case that along the dynamics it holds xi(q′) ≠ 0.
Thus, in order to define these components of gq(xi(t)),
we need to reason backward, assigning the values that they
would have in the case such sequence would be played with
a probability that goes to zero. In absence of degeneracy,
Algorithm 2 addresses this issue assigning a value of “1”
to a sequence q′′ if it is the (unique, the game being non–
degenerate) best response among the sequences extending
q′ and “0” otherwise, because at the convergence the agents
play only the best response sequences. Notice that, in this
case, gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) depends on both agents’ strategies.
Algorithm 2 generate gq(xi(t),x−i(t))
1: gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) = 0
2: for q′ ∈ Qi s.t. q′ ⊆ q do
3: gq(q′,xi(t),x−i(t)) = 1
4: for q′′ ∈ Qi s.t. q′′ ∩ q = q′ and q′′ = q′∣a∣ . . . : a ∈ ρ(h), q /→ h do
5: if xi(q′, t) ≠ 0 then
6: gq(q′′,xi(t),x−i(t)) = xi(q′′,t)xi(q′,t)
7: else if q′′ = argmaxq∗∶a(q∗)∈ρ(h)E[Ui(q∗,x−i)] then
8: gq(q′′,xi(t),x−i(t)) = 1
9: return gq(xi(t),x−i(t))
Given the above complete definition of gq, we can ob-
serve that all the components of gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) gener-
ated by Algorithm 2 are differentiable, being “0” or “1” or
“
xi(q′′,t)
xi(q′,t) ”. Therefore, we can derive the Jacobian as:
∂x˙1(qi, t)
∂x1(qj , t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(gqi(x1(t),x2(t))− x1(t))T ⋅U1 ⋅ x2(t) + x1(qi, t)⋅
⋅
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝
∂gqi
(x1(t),x2(t))
∂x1(qj , t) − ei
⎞
⎠
T
⋅U1 ⋅ x2(t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
if i = j
x1(qi, t) ⋅
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝
∂gqi
(x1(t),x2(t))
∂x1(qj , t) − ej
⎞
⎠
T
⋅U1 ⋅x2(t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if i ≠ j
∂x˙1(qi, t)
∂x2(ql, t) = x1(qi, t) ⋅ [(gqi (x1(t),x2(t))− x1(t))
T
⋅U1 ⋅ el]
∂x˙2(qk, t)
∂x1(qj , t) = x2(qk, t) ⋅ [e
T
j ⋅U2 ⋅ (gqk(x2(t),x1(t))− x2(t))]
∂x˙2(qk, t)
∂x2(ql, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x1(t)T ⋅U2 ⋅ (gqk(x2(t),x1(t)) −x2(t))+ x2(qk, t)⋅
⋅
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1(t)T ⋅U2 ⋅ ⎛⎝
∂gqk
(x2(t),x1(t))
∂x2(ql, t) − ek
⎞
⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
if k = l
x2(qk, t) ⋅
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣x1(t)
T ⋅U2 ⋅
⎛
⎝
∂gqk
(x2(t),x1(t))
∂x2(ql, t) − el
⎞
⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ if k ≠ l
With degenerate games, given a opponent’s strategy pro-
file x−i(t) and a sequence q ∈ Qi such that xi(q, t) = 0, we
can have multiple best responses. Consider, e.g., the game
in Example 2, with xT1 (t) = [ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 ],
x
T
2 (t) = [ 1 1 0 ] and compute gR1L3(x1(t),x2(t)):
both sequences R1L2 and R1R2 are best responses to x2(t).
Reasoning backward, we have different vectors gq(xi,x−i)
for different dynamics. More precisely, we can partition the
strategy space around (xi,x−i), associating a different best
response with a different subspace and therefore with a dif-
ferent gq(xi,x−i). Thus, in principle, in order to study the
stability of a strategy profile, we would need to compute and
analyze all the (potentially combinatory) Jacobians. How-
ever, we can show that all these Jacobians are the same and
therefore, even in the degenerate case, we can safely study
the Jacobian by using a gq(xi,x−i) as generated by Algo-
rithm 2 except, if there are multiple best responses, Step 7–8
assign “1” only to one, randomly chosen, best response.
Theorem 13 Given
• a specific sequence q ∈ Qi such that xi(q, t) = 0,
• a sequence–form strategy x−i(t),
• a sequence q′ ⊆ q,
• the number of sequences q′′ such that q′′ ∩ q = q′ and
q′′ = q′∣a∣ . . . : a ∈ ρ(h), q /→ h and that are best responses
to x−i(t) is larger than one,
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are independent from which
sequence q′′ is choosen as best–response.
Conclusions and future works
In this paper we developed efficient evolutionary game the-
ory techniques to deal with extensive–form games. We de-
signed, to the best of our knowledge, the first replicator dy-
namics applicable with the sequence form of an extensive–
form game, allowing an exponential reduction of time and
space w.r.t. the standard (normal–form) replicator dynam-
ics. Our replicator dynamics is realization equivalent w.r.t.
the standard one and therefore these two replicator dynam-
ics evolve in the same way. We show the equivalence for
both the discrete and continuous time cases. Finally, we dis-
cuss how standard tools from dynamical systems for the
study of the stability of strategies can be adopted with our
continuous–time replicator dynamics.
In future, we intend to explore the following problems:
extending the results on multi–agent learning when se-
quence form is adopted taking into account also Nash re-
finements for extensive–form games (we recall, while this
is possible with sequence form, it is not with the normal
form); extending our results to other forms of dynamics, e.g.,
best response dynamics, imitation dynamics, smoothed best
replies, the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics; compar-
ing the expressivity and the effectiveness of replicator dy-
namics when applied to the three representation forms.
Appendix
Relation between
normal–form/behavioral/sequence–form
strategies
We briefly review how realization equivalent strategies can
be derived according to (vS96).
Given a behavioral strategy σi, we can derive the (realiza-
tion) equivalent normal–form strategy and sequence–form
strategy as follow
pii(p) = ∏
a∈p∶p∈P
σi(a) ∀p ∈ Pi (22)
xi(q) = ∏
a∈q∶q∈Q
σi(a) ∀q ∈ Qi (23)
Given a normal–form strategy pii, we can derive the (real-
ization) equivalent behavioral strategy:
σi(a) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p) (24)
Given a normal–form strategy pii in reduced normal form,
we can derive the (realization) equivalent sequence–form
strategy:
xi(q∣a) = ∑
p∈P ∶a∈p
pii(p) (25)
We denote by q(a) the sequence whose last action is a. We
state the following lemma that we use to prove a main result.
Lemma 14 Given:
• a normal–form strategy pii in reduced normal form,
• its equivalent behavioral strategy σi,
• a subset of actions {a1, . . . , am} ⊆ Ai,
it holds
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p) = ∏
a∈⋃m
j=1
q(aj )
σi(a) (26)
Proof. Suppose that p = a1, . . . , an. By (22) we know that
pii(p) = σi(a1) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an) (27)
For all plan of actions p ∈ P where {a1, . . . , am} ∈ p, given
an actiona a such that a ∉ {a1, . . . , am}, we can have two
possibilities
1. a ∈ ⋃mj=1 q(aj), in this case the action a is present in every
plan of actions p, being always present {a1, . . . , am}; thus
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p′) =
σi(a) ⋅ m∏
j=1
σi(aj) ⋅ ∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
(σi(am+2) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an))
2. a ∉ ⋃mj=1 q(aj), in this case there is a subset P ′ ⊆ P such
that there is exactly a p ∈ P ′ for each action a′ ∈ ρ(h),
where a ∈ ρ(h).
By definition of behavioral strategy we know that
∑
a∈ρ(h)
σi(a) = 1 ∀h ∈H
Thus
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p) =
m
∏
j=1
σi(aj) ⋅ ∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
(σi(am+2) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an)) ⋅ ∑
a∈ρ(h)
σi(a) =
m
∏
j=1
σi(aj) ⋅ ∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
(σi(am+2) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an))
Thus, we can write
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p) = ∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
σi(a1) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an)
where, by Point 1, we know that all the actions a that are in
the path of some a1, . . . , am, a ∈ ⋃mj=1 q(aj), are present in
every plan of actions
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p) =
= ∏
a∈⋃m
j=1
q(aj )
σi(a) ⋅ ∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
σi(am+k) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ σi(an)
and, by Point 2, the other actions sum to “1”
∑
p∈P ∶a1,...,am∈p
pii(p) = ∏
a∈⋃m
j=1
q(aj )
σi(a)
This completes the proof of the lemma. ◻
Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. For each sequence q′′ that is a best–response to
x−i(t), we can have different vectors gq(xi(t),x−i(t)).
Suppose to take two different vectors gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) and
g
′
q(xi(t),x−i(t)). To prove the equality of the two Jaco-
bians we have to prove that each term is the same. All the
terms multiplied by xi(q, t) = 0 can be discarded, they be-
ing equal to zero. For this reason the only term different from
0 in the Jacobian is ∂x˙i(q,t)
∂x˙i(q,t) , thus we have to prove
(gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) − xi(t))T ⋅U1 ⋅ x−i(t) =
(g′q(xi(t),x−i(t)) − xi(t))T ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) (28)
We can rewrite the equality (28) as
g
T
q (xi(t),x−i(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t) = g′Tq (xi(t),x−i(t)) ⋅Ui ⋅ x−i(t)
that always holds because gq(xi(t),x−i(t)) and
g
′
q(xi(t),x−i(t)), even if they differ for some compo-
nents, provide the same expected utility by definition of best
response. Even if an agent randomizes over multiple best
responses, the theorem holds for the same reason. ◻
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